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1 Introduction
While it is well-established that futures markets are closely linked to the underlying
spot markets through the process of arbitrage, two main lines of argument exist in
the theoretical literature concerning the impact of introducing a futures market on
underlying spot market volatility. On the one hand, futures trading destabilizes the
underlying market by increasing stock market volatility due to the existence of uni-
formed investors. Attracted by high leverage badly informed investors induce noise in
the price discovery process and lower the information content of prices. This implies
higher spot market volatility as compared to the situation without a futures market
(Cox, 1976; Cagan, 1981; Figlewski, 1981; Stein, 1987; Hart and Kreps, 1986). On the
other hand, it is argued that futures markets have a stabilizing eect on the underlying
spot market because futures trading improves price discovery, enhances market e-
ciency, increases market depth as well as information 
ows and contributes to market
completion. As a result, the introduction of futures trading reduces the volatility of
the underlying spot market (Powers, 1970; Danthine, 1978; Bray, 1981; Kyle, 1985;
Stoll and Whaley, 1988).
Owing to this inconclusiveness, empirical investigations appear to be necessary in
order to gain additional insight into the impact of futures trading on spot market
volatility. While direct econometric tests of the theoretical approaches turn out to
be infeasible, the empirical literature exploits the introduction of futures markets to
quantify the eect on spot returns volatility. The majority of these recent time series
investigations share at least two common characteristics (Antoniou et al., 1998; Gulen
and Mayhew, 2000; McKenzie et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 2005): First, the studies
implement GARCH-type models augmented by dummy variables. These dummy vari-
ables allow the authors to discriminate between the pre- and the post-futures period
and thus to analyze the impact that the introduction of index futures markets has
on spot market returns volatility. Second, the available studies provide empirical ev-
idence primarily for mature stock markets in which institutional investors constitute
the predominant trader type.2
The rst characteristic can be challenged since the dummy variable approach relies
on an exogenous determination of the shift in stock returns volatility. Moreover, this
simple technique only models an abrupt one-step change in the volatility process which
does not constitute a realistic pattern of volatility changes. It rather turns out to be
more appropriate to model the shift in stock returns volatility endogenously and to let
the data speak for themselves. By construction, the one-step dummy variable approach
cannot capture a gradual adjustment to a new volatility regime and does not allow for
a transitory volatility change.
With respect to the second characteristic mentioned above index futures markets in
mature countries were mainly introduced in the 1980s at the time when institutional
investors were the dominant players in stock markets. Typically, nancial economists
tend to regard institutional investors as informed traders while individual investors are
considered as uninformed (for example, Lee et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Barber and
Odean, 2008; Kaniel et al., 2008). Therefore, the characteristic of futures markets being
mainly populated by informed investors comes into con
ict with the destabilization
hypothesis according to which uninformed investors induce noise in the price discovery
process and lower the information content of prices. Consequently, a valid empirical
approach should make use of an institutional framework in which uninformed investors
play a dominant role.
In this paper, we take into account the two aspects outlined above. Instead of a sim-
ple dummy variable approach we implement a Markov-switching-GARCH model that
has recently emerged in the nance literature. This econometric technique provides
empirical and graphic evidence of whether and of how the introduction of a futures
market changes the volatility structure of stock returns in the underlying spot market.
It allows for endogenous volatility regime shifts and reveals if the volatility structure
has changed transitorily or permanently.
Moreover, we exploit a unique institutional characteristic of the index futures market
in Poland which is in closer line with the destabilization hypothesis. In terms of trading
turnover individual investors in the Polish futures market accounted for more than
80% during the rst ve years after the start of the futures market (1998 - 2002) and3
around 75% during the following three years (2003 - 2005). Across recent years (2006
- 2007) individual investors' proportion of trading volume is still well above 55%. It
is precisely this dominance of presumably uninformed individual traders in the Polish
futures markets which enables us to investigate the destabilization hypothesis more
accurately than previous studies do. If the destabilization hypothesis is valid and if
individual investors are uninformed traders, our ndings for the Polish stock market
should provide clear-cut evidence in favour of a permanent increase in stock market
volatility after the introduction of the index futures market segment. Our empirical
evidence for Poland suggests that the introduction of index futures trading does not
destabilize the spot market. Furthermore, no evidence for stabilizing eects appears,
therefore the introduction of index futures trading does not seem to in
uence the
volatility of the underlying spot market. This nding is robust across 3 stock market
indices and consistent with results from a control group.
Our paper contributes to the voluminous literature on the impact of futures markets
on the underlying spot market. Recent studies explicitly elaborate the importance of
the investor structure and, in particular, the role of individual investors. McMillan and
Garcia (2008) investigate the impact of introducing the mini-futures contract for the
Spanish Ibex index in November 2001 on overall market eciency. The main purpose of
this contract was to stimulate individual traders' access to futures markets. However,
the mini-futures contract has entailed greater noise in the dynamic relationship between
spot and futures markets. Kurov (2008) analyzes the US S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100
E-mini futures in order to examine whether futures traders exhibit feedback trading
strategies. The median trade size in both market segments is consistent with small
individual traders accounting for a substantial proportion of trading. The empirical
ndings for both types of E-mini futures show that investors are positive feedback
traders who buy after price increases and sell after price declines.
Also related to our study is the work of Bae et al. (2004) who analyze the eect
of introducing the KOSPI 200 index futures trading in South Korea in May 1996 on
returns volatility and market eciency. Among other peculiarities in the KOSPI 200
futures market individual investors account for about 40% of the trading volume. Bae4
et al.'s results indicate that stock returns volatility and market eciency increase.
However, when compared to non-KOSPI 200 stocks, KOSPI 200 stocks show lower
returns volatility after the introduction of futures trading.
It is important to note that none of the studies just mentioned makes use of an econo-
metric technique which allows for endogenously determined volatility regime shifts and
a market setting with individual investors as the by far dominant investor group. The
key innovation of our paper therefore is to overcome this empirical lack by applying a
Markov-switching-GARCH model to Polish index futures traded in a market heavily
dominated by individual investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institu-
tional background of the Polish spot and index futures markets. Section 3 presents the
data set and develops our Markov-switching-GARCH methodology. Section 4 discusses
the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and oers some concluding comments.
2 The Polish spot and index futures markets
The rst stock exchange in Warsaw was founded in 1817. Having been closed during
World War II and the communist era, the Polish stock market was reopened on 16
April 1991. Since the rst session the WIG index has been calculated and comprises all
companies listed at Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) that meet base eligibility criteria.1
Exactly three years later, the WIG20 stock price index was launched. This index
re
ects the performance of 20 blue chip stocks listed on the main market of the WSE.
The sWIG80 (called WIRR until 16 March 2007) price index has been calculated
since 31 December 1994 and comprises 80 smaller companies listed at the WSE. The
mWIG40 (called MIDWIG until 16 March 2007), a mid-cap price index, followed on 21
September 1998, and the TechWIG price index, representing innovative technologies,
on 31 December 1999.
Being a medium-size stock exchange in Europe, the WSE ranks rst in market capi-
talisation among the exchanges in all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.
1All information about the WSE is taken from the annual fact books. The comparisons of the
WSE with other exchanges are based on the World Federation of Exchanges Annual Report 2007.5
As of 2007, the total market capitalization of the WSE has reached USD 212 billion,
which is far higher than the capitalization of other CEE countries markets like Bu-
dapest (USD 46 billion) and Prague (USD 70 billion). In fact, its size rivals that of
smaller Western European exchanges such as Vienna (USD 236 billion) or Luxembourg
(USD 166 billion). The Polish stock market has been growing rapidly in part because
formerly state-owned companies were privatised and listed on the WSE. The rst for-
eign company (Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG) was listed at the WSE on 14 October
2003. Since 1 May 2004, the exchange's market structure has been complying with EU
standards, i.e. securities trading has two segments, namely the main market and the
regulated unocial parallel market.
Initially, there was a spot market only. Futures contracts on the WIG20 have been
traded at the WSE since 16 January 1998. This was the rst derivative product
introduced by the exchange. It became quickly popular among Polish investors. On 1
August 2000, futures contracts on the TechWIG index were introduced, with contracts
on the mWIG40 index following on 18 February 2002.2 Since 1998 the index futures
market in Poland has grown substantially as Figure 1 illustrates in terms of trading
volume at the WSE.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
With a volume of 9.36 million contracts traded and a notional value of USD 122,191
million, total index futures trading at the WSE in 2007 is comparable in volume to
trading at Western European markets such as at the Borsa Italia (6.74 million con-
tracts; USD 1,428,831 million) or at the Spanish MEFF (11.30 million contracts; USD
1,774,694 million). At the same time, the Polish stock index futures market is consider-
ably larger compared to those of other CEE countries, as for instance that of Budapest
2For completeness: Futures contracts on individual stocks were rst launched on 22 January 2001.
Put and call options with the WIG20 as underlying were introduced on 22 September 2003, and
on individual stocks started trading on 17 October 2005. Moreover, trading has been suspended in
futures on three individual stocks. Futures contracts on USD debuted on 25 September 1998, followed
by futures on the Euro on 1 May 1999. T-note futures were launched on 14 February 2005. Ordinary
warrants started trading on 9 March 1998, with American-style warrants on WIG20 futures contracts
joining in on 24 September 2001.6
(3.95 million contracts; USD 5,758 million) and even those of some Western European
exchanges such as Athens (2.74 million contracts; USD 52,096 million) and Vienna
(0.23 million contracts; USD 21,561 million).
Trading on the spot and derivatives market takes place on the continuous trading
system of the WSE.3 The futures contracts expire in March, June, September, and
December. The last trading day of any given contract is the third Friday of its expiry
month, or the last trading day prior to that Friday in case of public holidays.
More relevant to our eld of research is the unique investor structure on the Polish
futures market. Figure 2 exhibits all details on the investor structure between 1997
and 2007. On the futures markets, individual investors are the dominating trader
type accounting for about 75% of the turnover value on average over the past 9 years,
with domestic institutions contributing 20% while the remaining 5% were allocated
to foreign investors. During the last 11 years, the spot turnover shares of domestic
private, domestic institutional and foreign investors have remained relatively equal.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
This dominance of individual investors on the futures market is mainly due to three
factors: First, small transactions can be settled in the Polish derivatives market. For
example, the value of an index futures contract equals the product of the multiplier
and the price of the underlying. The former was set to only 10 zl the current value of
which is about USD 2.75. This small multiplier makes index futures aordable for small
investors. Second, individual investors who wish to trade in the Polish futures market
can easily register to do so without formal barriers. Third, major Polish institutional
investors are not permitted to trade in derivatives. Polish pension funds are not allowed
3The trading hours of the continuous trading system were 12.00am to 4.00pm on the spot and
10.15am to 4.00pm on the derivatives market prior to the introduction of the quotation system
WARSET on 17 November 2000. Thereafter, stocks were traded continuously from 10.00am to 4.10pm
and derivatives from 9.00am to 4.10pm. For both markets, an auction is held at opening and closing
of the session. On 1 September 2003, the WSE has introduced a 10-minute post-auction phase for
spot and derivatives trading, which follows the closing auction at 4.10pm. Since 3 October 2005, the
continuous trading on the spot market started 30 minutes earlier at 9.30am and closing auctions on
spot and derivatives markets were held at 4.20pm, i.e. 10 minutes later than before. On 1 September
2008, the WSE trading hours were further extended. After this, trading sessions on the spot market
began at 9.00am and sessions on the derivatives market started at 8.30am.7
to invest in derivatives. Originally, domestic mutual funds were also not authorized to
place investments into derivatives. A change in legislation, i.e. a new Act of Investment
Funds coming into eect in the Fall of 2004, opened the index futures market to this
class of institutional investors.
3 Data and econometric technique
Our data set consists of daily close prices of the WIG20, the TechWIG and the mWIG40
stock price indices. To allow for comparison to be made between these three market
indices and markets which are not underlying any futures contracts, we also include
daily close prices of the WIG and sWIG80 index to our data set. The WIG and
sWIG80 index act as a control group to the other three market indices. The WIG
index comprises all companies listed at the WSE, including the ones contained in the
WIG20, the TechWIG and the mWIG40 indices. This might weaken its quality as a
clear-cut control variable. Therefore, the control group also contains the sWIG80 index
which excludes completely WIG20 and mWIG40 index participants, but includes some
of the stocks contained in the TechWIG. Furthermore, in order to control for the
interdependence of the Polish stock market with the international stock market, we
employ daily close prices of the S&P500 index. The time series for the WIG20, the
TechWIG, the mWIG40, the WIG, and the sWIG80 were all obtained from the WSE
while the S&P500 index data were compiled from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
The sample periods run from 1 November 1994 to 31 December 2007 for the WIG20
and the WIG (3292 trading days), from 31 December 1994 to 31 December 2007 for
the sWIG80 (3253 trading days), from 31 December 1999 to 31 December 2007 for
the TechWIG (2006 trading days), and from 21 September 1998 to 31 December 2007
for the mWIG40 (2505 trading days).4 The sample period ends on 31 December 2007
to obtain a data set under similar conditions regarding the investor structure. At the
WSE futures market, in 2008 and 2009 the share of trading volume attributable to
domestic institutional investors has further increased which erodes our testing basis of
4The WSE has back-calculated the TechWIG price index, which was introduced on 19 May 2000,
to 31 December 1999.8
an extraordinarily high proportion of individual investors. Part of the observed shift
in the investor structure can be rationalized by changes in the regulatory framework of
the Polish nancial market.5 For each index used in our econometric analysis below,
we dene the daily return as Rt  100  [ln(Indext)   ln(Indext 1)].
In order to model endogenous volatility shifts in our index return time series fRtg,
we make use of a Markov-switching-GARCH model as developed in Gray (1996b) and
recently rened in Wil
ing (2009) and Gelman and Wil
ing (2009). The general idea
behind this econometric framework is that the data generating process (DGP) of the
return Rt is aected by a latent random variable which represents the state the DGP
is in on any particular date t. In our analysis we denote this latent state variable by St
and use it to discriminate between two distinct volatility regimes. We specify St = 1
to indicate that the DGP is in the high-volatility regime whereas St = 2 is meant to
indicate that the DGP is in the low-volatility regime.
The basic element of our Markov-switching-GARCH model is the well-known proba-
bility density function of a mean-shifted t-distribution with  degrees of freedom, mean
 and variance h, t;;h. Based on this parametric density function, our next step will
consist in specifying stochastic processes for the mean and the volatility in regime i,
denoted by it and hit, according to which the stock return Rt is generated conditional
upon the regime indicator St = i;i = 1;2. After having specied it and hit we can






t1;1t;h1t with probability p1t
t2;2t;h2t with probability (1   p1t)
; (1)
where t 1 denes the information set as of date t   1 and p1t  PrfSt = 1jt 1g
denotes the so-called ex-ante probability of being in regime 1 at time t.
In modeling our regime-dependent mean equation, we explicitly take into account
the possibility of rst-order autocorrelation in index returns and the interdependence
5A new Act of Investment Funds coming into eect in the Fall of 2004, opened the index futures
market to mutual funds. At the same time, a generally more liberal mutual fund regulation policy
triggered a rapid growth of the number of mutual funds in the Polish market, beginning only in the
following year of 2005. Moreover, the new Act allowed foreign investment funds to operate directly in
the Polish market. These institutional changes triggered a massive growth of mutual funds in Poland.9
of the Polish stock market with the international stock market. We meet both aspects
by including Rt 1 and the lagged S&P500 index return R
SP
t 1 as a control variable in
our mean equation:
it = a0i + a1iRt 1 + a2iR
SP
t 1 for i = 1;2: (2)
In contrast to the mean equation (2), the specication of an adequate GARCH pro-
cess for the regime-specic variance hit is more problematic. Without going into tech-
nical detail, we rst consider an aggregate of conditional stock index-return variances





















  [p1t1t + (1   p1t)2t]
2 : (3)
The quantity ht now provides the basis for the specication of the regime-specic con-
ditional variances hit+1;i = 1;2 in the form of a parsimonious GARCH(1,1)-structure.
More explicitly, we follow the suggestion of Dueker (1997) and rst parameterize the
degrees of freedom of the t;;h-distribution by q = 1=, so that (1   2q) = (   2)=,
and then specify our regime-specic GARCH equation as:
hit = b0i + b1i(1   2qi)
2
t 1 + b2iht 1 (4)
with ht 1 as being given according to Eq. (3) and t 1 being obtained from:
t 1 = Rt 1   E [Rt 1jt 2]
= Rt 1   [p1t 11t 1 + (1   p1t 1)2t 1]: (5)
It is important to note here that for i = 1;2 the sums b1i(1   2qi) + b2i of the coef-
cients from Eq. (4) constitute convenient measures of the regime-specic persistence
of volatility shocks. The higher the value of this measure the more time it takes until
a shock dies out. A regime-specic volatility shock will die out in nite time if the
coecient sum is less than 1. For the case of the coecient sum being equal to 1
6See Gray (1996b) for a rigorous formal discussion.10
(i.e. for an integrated GARCH(1,1) process) volatility shocks have a permanent eect
and the unconditional variance of the process becomes innitely large.
Finally, we close our Markov-switching-GARCH model by parameterizing the regime
indicator St as a rst-order Markov process with constant transition probabilities.
Denoting by i the probability of the DGP persisting in regime i (for i = 1;2) between
the dates t   1 and t, we specify:
PrfSt = 1jSt 1 = 1g = 1; PrfSt = 2jSt 1 = 1g = 1   1;
PrfSt = 2jSt 1 = 2g = 2; PrfSt = 1jSt 1 = 2g = 1   2:
(6)
Now, the log-likelihood function of our Markov-switching-GARCH(1,1) model can
be obtained by performing similar calculations as in Gray (1996b). The exact form
of the function is presented in Wil
ing (2009). The log-likelihood function contains
the ex-ante probabilities p1t  PrfSt = 1jt 1g which can be estimated via a recursive
scheme. These probabilities are useful in forecasting one-step-ahead regimes based on
an information set that evolves over time. In our context, the ex-ante probabilities
p1t re
ect current market perceptions of the one-step-ahead volatility regime, thus
representing an adequate measure of stock market volatility sentiments. Besides the ex-
ante probabilities p1t we also address the so-called smoothed probabilities PrfSt = 1jTg
which can be computed by the use of lter techniques after the model estimation has
been carried out.7 The smoothed probabilities are based on the full sample-information
set T and provide a tool for inferring ex post if and when volatility regime switches
have occurred in the sample.
4 Empirical results
Table I presents the maximum-likelihood estimates of the Markov-switching-GARCH
model for the WIG20, the TechWIG and the mWIG40 stock index returns. Max-
imization of the log-likelihood function was performed by the 'MAXIMIZE'-routine
7In this paper, we have computed all smoothed probabilities with a lter algorithm provided by
Gray (1996a).11
within the software package RATS 7.1 using the BFGS-algorithm, heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimates of standard errors and suitably chosen starting values for all pa-
rameters involved. Overall, the majority of the coecients in the mean and GARCH
equations (2) and (4) are statistically signicant at the 1% level for all index return
time series.8
[Insert Table I about here]
4 of the 6 autoregressive coecients a11 and a12 are statistically signicant and pos-
itive. A positive rst-order autoregressive structure in stock index returns is an empir-
ical nding often reported in the literature that can be explained by non-synchronous
trading (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990), time-varying expected returns (Conrad and Kaul,
1988), transaction costs (Mech, 1993) and feedback trading (Shiller, 1989; Sentana and
Wadhwani, 1992). The TechWIG exhibits a signicant negative autoregressive coe-
cient a11, while a11 is not signicant for the WIG20 and the mWIG40. For all 3 stock
market indices the coecients a21 and a22 of the lagged S&P500 index returns RSP
t 1 are
statistically signicant at the 1% level and positive in both regimes indicating strong
interdependence between US and Polish stock markets.
Analyzing the estimated GARCH parameters, we nd that the coecient sums
b1i(1 2qi)+b2i are less than 1 for all stock return time series across both regimes. This
result suggests that we have stationary conditional volatility processes in all regimes
and implies that volatility shocks die out in nite time. The estimates of the transition
probabilities 1 and 2 are all close to 1 indicating a high degree of regime persistence.
The lower part of Table 1 contains a diagnostic check of the model t by providing
Ljung-Box Q-statistics for serial correlation of the squared standardized residuals for
the lags 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10. For the TechWIG and the mWIG40 the null hypothesis
8Some comments on the probability distribution of the conventional t-statistic within our Markov-
switching-GARCH framework are in order. It has to be noted that the exact nite-sample distribution
of our t-statistics is generally unknown. However, owing to some well-known asymptotic properties of
general maximum likelihood estimators in conjunction with an appropriate limiting distribution result,
it can be concluded that under the null hypothesis of a single parameter being equal to zero, our t-
statistics should converge in distribution towards a standard normal variate. This implies asymptotic
critical values of 2.58, 1.96 and 1.64 for the absolute value of the t-statistic at the 1%, 5% and
10%-levels, respectively.12
of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected up to lag 10 at any conventional signicance
level. This result provides some evidence in favour of our two-regime Markov-switching-
GARCH specication. By contrast, for the WIG20 the Ljung-Box tests indicate serial
correlation for the lags 1, 2, and 3. This nding is caused by two extreme daily WIG20-
returns recorded on the 28th and 29th October 1997 during the Asian crisis. Since the
removal of these extreme stock returns from the data set eliminates all serial correlation
while leaving the estimation results (not shown, but available upon request) unaected,
we decided to retain the observations in the sample.
Next, we address the ex-ante and the smoothed probabilities PrfSt = 1jt 1g and
PrfSt = 1jTg both of which are relevant to detecting how often and at which dates
the Polish stock market switched between the high-volatility and the low-volatility
regimes. Figures 3, 4, and 5 display these regime-1 probabilities (in the upper panels)
along with the conditional variance processes (in the lower panels) estimated from the
Markov-switching-GARCH models for the WIG20, the TechWIG, and the mWIG40
index returns. Since the ex-ante probabilities are determined on the basis of an evolving
(and thus smaller) information set, they exhibit a more erratic dynamic behaviour than
the smoothed regime-1 probabilities. In all panels the time period after the introduction
of index futures trading is marked by grey shading. In all gures periods of high
probabilities are associated with periods of high conditional volatility indicating that
regime 1 is the high-volatility regime.
[Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here]
According to the destabilization hypothesis, uninformed investors induce noise in
the price discovery process and lower the information content of prices. As described
in Section 2, individual and thus presumably uninformed investors are the dominant
trader type in Polish index futures markets. If the destabilization hypothesis is valid
and if individual investors are uninformed traders, we should see a clear-cut permanent
increase in stock market volatility after the introduction of futures trading. As a result,
in terms of our Markov-switching-GARCH approach, the spot market returns should
perform a sustained switch to the high-volatility regime along with a higher conditional13
variance after the introduction of the futures market.
Looking at Figures 3, 4, and 5, for the most part, the evolution of the regime-1
probabilities and the conditional variance exhibit similar patterns for all three index
returns. For the WIG20 a period of high volatility begins around February 1997 and
ends in May 1999. After about 6 months of low stock market volatility a regime-switch
to the high-volatility regime takes place at the beginning of 2000. This interval of high
volatility ends in the second half of 2001. Besides some minor spikes in the regime-
1 probabilities and the conditional variance in the years 2006 and 2007, the WIG20
remains in the low-volatility regime until the end of the sample period. The TechWIG
index starts in the high-volatility regime in January 2000. Comparable to the pattern
observed for the second period of high volatility for the WIG20, a gradual transition
towards the low-volatility regime occurs in the rst half of 2001. The TechWIG index
return process continues in the low-volatility regime and shows one temporary increase
in volatility at the end of 2007.
Three periods of high volatility emerge for the mWIG40 index. The mid-cap index
begins in a period of high volatility in September 1998. The regime-1 probabilities
and the conditional variance for the mWIG40 indicate a period in the low-volatility
regime from the middle to the end of 2000. During the same time period, a temporary
phase of low stock market volatility is also present in the WIG20 index process. From
January 2000 until the end of the year, with a short interruption, the mWIG40 index
switches to the high-volatility regime. Also the WIG20 and TechWIG progress in
high-volatility regimes during this time period. In contrast to the evolution of the
regime-1 probabilities of the WIG20 and TechWIG index the mWIG40 index switches
to the high-volatility regime at the end of 2005 until mid-2007. But on average, the
conditional volatility of the mWIG40 during this time period is considerably below the
levels of the years 1998 and 1999.
Most importantly, Figures 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate the impact of WIG20, TechWIG,
and mWIG40 index futures trading on the conditional volatility of the underlying
stock market index. The introduction of WIG20 index futures on the 16 January
1998 falls into the high-volatility regime. The temporarily lower volatility from mid-14
1999 to 2000 provides evidence against a sustained switch to the high-volatility regime
after the introduction of the futures market which should be observed according to the
destabilization hypothesis. Afterwards, from mid-2001 to the end of the sample period,
the WIG20 persistently remains in the low-volatility regime.
8 months after the introduction of TechWIG futures trading on 1 August 2000,
around April 2001, a gradual transition towards the low-volatility regime occurs for
the underlying TechWIG spot market returns. Once again, this empirical nding does
not reveal an increase in stock market volatility after the introduction of futures trad-
ing. The mWIG40 process remains in the low-volatility regime for 3.5 years after the
introduction of index futures trading on 18 February 2002. There is a period of high
volatility from the end of 2005 until mid-2007 after the introduction of index futures
on the mWIG40 which occurs with a very long lag after the event. Furthermore, it is a
temporary period of high volatility only and the levels of the conditional variance are
relatively low as compared to the high-volatility regime in 1998-1999.
Summing up, for all three indices, the introduction of index futures does not lead to a
transition to a high-volatility regime along with a higher conditional variance after the
futures market introduction. Furthermore, there is no evidence for stabilizing eects.
Thus the introduction of index futures trading does not seem to be connected with the
volatility of the underlying spot market.
To gain further insights into the possibly destabilizing eect of futures trading on spot
price volatility, we investigate the spot market returns for the WIG and the sWIG80
index. Futures contracts are not traded on the WIG and the sWIG80 index so that the
two indices act as a control group. In contrast to the WIG index, the sWIG80 fully
excludes WIG20 and mWIG40 index participants and to most parts stocks contained
in the TechWIG. Therefore, the sWIG80 should further strengthen the reliability of our
control group. If the destabilizing hypothesis is correct we expect a pattern of regime-1
probabilities and conditional variances that diers from the other indices for which a
futures market has been introduced. Figures 6 and 7 display the regime-1 probabilities
(in the upper panels) along with the conditional variance processes (in the lower panels)
estimated from the Markov-switching-GARCH models for the WIG, and the sWIG8015
index returns.9 For the most part, the evolution of the regime-1 probabilities and the
conditional variances of the WIG and the sWIG80 index exhibits a similar pattern
than that of the other 3 index returns. Therefore, we conclude that, instead of being
governed by index futures trading, the observed switches to high-volatility periods are
more likely to have been caused by other events.
[Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here]
After a period of low conditional volatility we observe a jump to the high-volatility
regime around February 1997 when all blue chip stocks contained in the WIG20 became
continuously tradable. The rst major unstable interval from October 1997 to May
1999 may have been induced by a sequence of crises with worldwide impacts on nancial
markets. The high volatile stock market after the end of 1997, around mid-1998 and
after the beginning of 1999 may be associated with the Asian (October/November
1997), the Russian (August/September 1998) and the Brazilian (January 1999) crises.
The second period (March 2000 to April 2001) in the high-volatility regime can be
related to the worldwide bear market following the burst of the 'dot-com bubble'.
Combining the evidence from Figures 3, 4 and 5 with that from Figures 6 and 7,
the overall result is that the introduction of index futures trading in Poland does not
destabilize the underlying cash markets. The observed switches between volatility
regimes have not been caused by index futures trading, but rather appear to have been
driven by other events such as nancial turmoil. This result is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that the Polish index futures market should have increased spot market
volatility. The evidence is even more compelling given the specic investor structure of
the Polish futures market where presumably uninformed individuals are the dominant
trader type.
9Estimates of the Markov-switching-GARCH model for the WIG and the sWIG80 index returns
are not reported but are available on request.16
5 Summary and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the introduction of index futures
trading in Poland on the conditional return volatility of the underlying stock index
markets. The Polish index futures market is dominated by individual investors, which
are presumably uninformed. This unique institutional peculiarity of the index futures
market in Poland enables us to investigate the destabilization hypothesis more accu-
ratley than available studies do. To overcome econometric shortcomings of the existing
literature we employ a Markov-switching-GARCH approach to endogenously identify
distinct volatility regimes.
After examining the evidence, we conclude that the introduction of index futures
trading in Poland does not lead to an increase in volatility of the underlying stock
market. Consequently, we reject the destabilizing hypothesis. Furthermore, index
futures trading does not seem to in
uence spot market volatility at all. The observed
switches between volatility regimes in index returns may be explained by other events
such as nancial turmoil.
Our empirical investigation allows us to draw two major conclusions. First, we
exploit a unique institutional setting in which individuals are the dominant trader type
in the futures markets. Owing to this market structure, our empricial ndings rely on a
data basis with a presumably high noise proportion in the index futures market which
may have transmitted to the underlying spot market via arbitrage links. However,
the introduction of index futures trading in Poland does not lead to an increase in
volatility of the underlying stock market. Therefore, we generally question whether
the destabilizing hypothesis typically raised in the literature is a valid hypothesis on
the impact of index futures trading on the underlying spot pricing process.
Second, we cast doubt on conclusions drawn from the empirical evidence in the avail-
able literature which implements GARCH-type models augmented by dummy variables.
By construction, the one-step dummy variable approach cannot capture a gradual ad-
justment to a new volatility regime and does not allow for a transitory volatility change.
In this paper, we employ a Markov-switching-GARCH approach which allows for en-17
dogenous volatility regime shifts and reveals if the volatility structure has changed
transitorily or permanently. Using data from Poland, we are able to identify distinct
non-permanent volatility regimes that do not seem to be governed by index futures
trading. This precise identication could not have been achieved by a simple dummy
variable approach.18
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Conditional variancesTable I: Estimates and related statistics for Markov-switching-GARCH model 
 WIG20    mWIG20 TechWIG   
Parameters Estimate  S.  E. Estimate S. E. Estimate  S. E.
Regime 1 
01 a   -0.0713 0.0816 0.1744*** 0.0381 -0.111  0.0774
11 a   -0.0548 0.0340 0.0221 0.0301 -0.1113***  0.0373
21 a   0.5502*** 0.0525 0.5671*** 0.0559 0.6795***  0.0607
01 b   0.1885** 0.0870 0.0262 0.0204 0.0402  0.1454
11 b   0.1811*** 0.0325 0.0878** 0.0401 0.1419***  0.0616
21 b   0.7789*** 0.0358 0.8883*** 0.0439 0.8521***  0.0549
1 q   0.0960*** 0.0252 0.1428*** 0.0216 0.0477  0.0344
[ 21 1 11 ) 2 1 ( b q b + − ]   [0.9253]   [0.9510] [0.9804]   
Regime 2 
02 a   0.0658** 0.0279 0.0353* 0.0193 0.0686**  0.0301
12 a   0.0419** 0.0199 0.1231*** 0.0284 0.0440*  0.0225
22 a   0.2438*** 0.0299 0.1211*** 0.0176 0.2639***  0.0367
02 b   0.0237 0.0164 0.0268*** 0.0091 0.0150**  0.0069
12 b   0.0446*** 0.0129 0.1412*** 0.0271 0.0579***  0.0165
22 b   0.9386*** 0.0302 0.8000*** 0.0404 0.9299***  0.0174
2 q   0.1016*** 0.0203 0.1040*** 0.0198 0.1586***  0.0207
[] 22 2 12 ) 2 1 ( b q b + −   [0.9741]   [0.9118] [0.9695]   
Transition probabilities 
1 π 0.9958*** 0.0025 0.9950*** 0.0030 0.9954***  0.0031
2 π 0.9996*** 0.0004 0.9980*** 0.0012 0.9998***  0.0003
Log-likelihood 
 -6249.4161 -3534.9395 -3789.1212
Residual analysis  Estimate  p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
2




  4.639* (0.098) 0.893 (0.640) 0.539  (0.764)
3 LB
2
  7.266* (0.064) 0.915 (0.822) 0.846  (0.838)
5 LB
2
  7.563 (0.182) 2.506 (0.776) 3.459  (0.630)
10 LB   12.896 (0.230) 4.731 (0.908) 6.353  (0.785)
Notes: Estimates for the parameters from Eqs. (1) to (6).   denotes the Ljung-Box 
Q-statistics for serial correlation of the squared standardized residuals up to i lags. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
2
i LB